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University of California at Berkeley. Robert Reich was Secretary of Labor under
President Bill Clinton.
Robert B. Reich
As part of UMass Boston’s recent celebration to mark the inauguration of
Chancellor Michael F. Collins, M.D., the Division of Corporate, Continuing
and Distance Education (CCDE) hosted a “virtual symposium” featuring
Robert B. Reich. Between April 24 and May 8, CCDE posted a streaming
video and a downloadable audio file of a presentation that Professor Reich
had delivered on April 11, 2006 at the national conference of the University
Continuing Education Association. This talk was supplemented, on May 3,
by a live teleconferencing Q&A session with Professor Reich and about
fifty UMass Boston graduate students.
s someone who has been involved with economic policy and who
thinks a great deal about education and the economy, let me begin by
assuring you that I believe the purpose of education is not primarily eco-
nomic. Like you, I am engaged in education because it is a way not only to
ensure that people have full lives, but also to help people become engaged
members of their communities. If we lose sight of the function of education
in preparing students to become whole people and better citizens, then we
have ignored one of the most fundamental aspects of education. Having
said that, I would like to address the economic aspects of the future of
learning because that is an area in which I have expertise and interest.
What we are seeing in this country and around the world is a revolution
in how education is thought about with regard to economic development,
how education is provided utilizing new technologies, even how education is
understood as a vehicle that enables people to participate in economic
functions and assume economic roles. More than ever before, it is a vehicle
of upward mobility at a time when upward mobility is more important than
ever.
We can best understand this by discussing three major vectors or trends
that are shaping continuing and higher education in this country and around
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the world. They are so central to education that we take them for granted;
however, we often comprehend them inappropriately or wrongly.
Globalization
The first vector is globalization. It is rare that an expression goes from
obscurity to meaninglessness without passing through coherence, but that
has been the case with globalization. Most of us think in terms of trade
between people over there — foreigners — and people over here — us.
Whether we live in the United States, France, Germany, or the United
Kingdom, we think in terms of national boundaries — “us” versus “them,”
our companies versus everyone else’s. The cartoon version of globalization
accentuates national competitiveness, a term repeatedly used. It implies that
our ability to compete as a national entity is measured by how much more
our firms and employees can sell to theirs, and that our economy will be
successful if we sell more to them than they to us.
In cartoonland, only a limited number of jobs exist; if we do not get them,
they will. The number of good jobs, by deduction, is even more limited. The
way that we increase our share of jobs — at their expense — is by being
better at selling and trading: More trade means more jobs, so in cartoonland
the North American Free Trade Act means more jobs in and for the United
States.
But what really happens? First, the idea that there are American compa-
nies or Japanese or French companies is less and less true, and, more impor-
tant, less relevant. A decade ago, when I was Secretary of Labor, our family
needed a car. I looked around and kicked tires, did some comparison shop-
ping, and found a car that met our family’s needs — a Toyota. A consider-
ate husband, I talked to my wife about it. She agreed that it was a fine car.
But then she said, “Let me remind you that you’re Secretary of Labor . . . of
the United States.” My wife is quite an astute politician. Inevitably, we went
to an American showroom and ended up buying a Ford. I felt pretty good
about having done the right thing. As we bought it, out of curiosity I asked
the showroom dealer, “I know this has an American nameplate, but can you
tell me, was this car made in the United States by American workers?” He
looked at me for a long instant trying to decide where I was coming from,
smiled, and said, “What’s your preference?” The reality is that these cars
come from all over the world; their components come from everywhere
through “global supply chains.” This is business-speak to describe how
things are built, things are serviced, and services are added to the value of
things all over the place. What it means is that your standard of living will
depend less on the profitability of companies headquartered or doing busi-
ness where you live —  city, region, state, or country — and more on the
value that we add to an increasingly global system of production.
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This added value determines our compensation, wealth, income —  our
economic wellbeing. If we add a lot of value, we will do fine, no matter
which companies do what. All of the talk about outsourcing fails to take this
into account. While American-based firms are outsourcing, foreign firms are
coming to the United States to make or buy things here. When I lived in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, the German firm Siemens had a huge research
facility not far from where I lived. Why? Because Cambridge is the home of
Harvard and MIT. If you want to have a research facility, one of the choice
locations is where Harvard and MIT are located; whether you are Siemens,
Microsoft, Nokia, you want to be where the brains and human capital are.
That is true of every large university community in the world; if you know
it, they will come.
A few years ago, I had to have my hips replaced. The new hips are
beautiful, just marvels of technology and medicine. After they were put in, I
asked the people at Brigham and Women’s Hospital where my hips had been
made. I was told that my hips were designed in France and fabricated in
Germany. So I now have French designer hips. But the total value of the
hips was not only the French design and the German fabrication; it also
included the service of putting in the hips. In fact, in terms of value added,
most of the cost of the hips came from the extraordinary surgical skill of the
doctors at an American hospital. People from all over the world come to
Brigham and Women’s for services like hip surgery.
The point is that the expertise in design, fabrication, and surgery is a
worldwide phenomenon. I am literally the embodiment of an international
system of production and services. People believe falsely that products are
made wherever it can be done most cheaply; everyone assumes that is why
China manufactures so many goods. But my hips were made in Germany,
not China. Why? What’s the difference between my hips and the things that
you find in Wal-Mart? It is that global companies and global capital will
make things wherever they will get the highest return on investment. Cheap
labor is only one of the factors; expertise is the other. A huge amount of
capital flows into Germany, the United States, France — places where the
cost of labor is relatively high — because of the expertise, because of the
value added by individuals possessing talent and knowledge.
Our world is not engaged in a race to the bottom in terms of wages; if
this were true, Bangladesh would be the manufacturing and service capital
of the world. China itself is moving some production to Vietnam because
Chinese wages are rising. But more important, the Chinese are starting to
do different kinds of work, not necessarily losing jobs. In India, Bangalore
has centers of high technology for research and development and advanced
software design and production. Every company in the world is going to
places like Bangalore and China in search of talent, weighing the variables
of cost and expertise. If they can get very low cost and good expertise or
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exceptional expertise at medium cost, that is where they will go. And if they
can only get the expertise they need at high wages, then they will end up
there.
Companies also consider proximity to customers. They want to be close
to customers who are demanding, always wanting complicated features for
which they might be willing to pay more. So we need not worry about
outsourcing or insourcing; they are characteristics of worldwide value-
added chains. Every company in the world is going every place. The value
that we add — the expertise, insight, problem-solving — will determine the
standard of living.
Technology
The second vector has to do with technological change. Everyone talks
about it, but few understand what it means. Yesterday, to get here by plane,
I went to a kiosk to check myself in. Nowadays, most people do not have to
deal with airline personnel to check in; compared to a couple of years ago,
there is almost no one at the counter. When I tell my students that it was not
so long ago that I had to deal with a person in order to get money or put it
into my account, they find it hard to believe. Telephone operators, bank
tellers, airline counter clerks, service station attendants — all sorts of
people have been replaced by technology, by computers and software.
Consider the manufacturing sector. Thirty years ago, about 20 percent of
our economy was based on manufacturing; in our present-day economy, the
part of our gross domestic product based on manufacturing is about 20
percent. How can that be? Manufacturing is shrinking in terms of jobs, but
not in terms of output. Agriculture is still a big percentage of our output,
though only three percent of Americans work on farms. Why is that? It is
because productivity soared.
One of the great myths is that the United States lost manufacturing jobs
to Mexico and China. It is true that some companies put manufacturing jobs
in places where they could be done more cheaply, but we also lost jobs
because of robots and numerically controlled machine tools. Not too long
ago I was asked to preside at a ribbon-cutting ceremony of a new factory in
the Midwest.  The governor of the state was proud of having won the
bidding war among states to lure the company from Europe. Even before I
arrived for the ceremony, the factory was running at full capacity. When I
went into the facility to see what was going on, I naturally looked for
people — assembly line workers, the kind who used to work in factories. In
all, I counted eleven warm bodies, all technicians sitting in front of screens,
working to improve the algorithms that were running the manufacturing
process. The robots and the tools did all the production.
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Anyone who believes that we are losing jobs because production headed to
Mexico or China has no clue about what is going on within the facilities that
are left here. Even if we could erect a wall to manufacturing here in the
United States, we would still lose jobs because technology is taking them
away. China is losing manufacturing jobs. How is this possible? It is because
until fifteen years ago, Chinese factories were inefficient state-run enterprises.
But as more technology is finding its way into Chinese factories, they are
becoming more efficient and productive. When productivity goes up, it means
that fewer people are needed to produce the same volume of goods. So al-
though China is doing more of the world’s manufacturing, the number of
people responsible for manufacturing is decreasing.
Technology is a massive agent of change that cannot be divorced from
globalization. One reason that we have a tight, interwoven network of global
relationships that allows capital to flow quickly to where it can do something
the most cheaply and best is improved telecommunications; everyone is within
reach. A typical American organization of the 1950s or 1960s, whether in
business or higher education, resembled a pyramid. At the top, a few people
were the fount of all wisdom and insight. Beneath them were middle-level
managers whose job was to implement the wise initiatives of the people at the
top. At the bottom were a lot of people doing the same thing over and over.
Most organizations were dominated by the theory of economies of scale: the
more identical things you could produce, the lower the fixed costs because
fixed costs could be amortized over more items.
This was the central creed of American business in the 1950s and 1960s:
high-volume production that was standardized and stable, mass production.
This created an economy of mass consumption by the 1950s. Within this
system of mass production were unionized workers; 35 percent of the Ameri-
can workforce was unionized during the 1950s, a sufficiently large percentage
to set wages for most of the country. Big business was content and able to
settle for fairly generous wages and benefits during this period because there
were not that many competitors in every industry, and most of the competi-
tors in the automotive, chemical manufacturing, steelmaking, and appliance-
making industries dealt with the same unions. The cost of wage and benefit
agreements could be passed along to consumers. By no means was it a golden
age, certainly not for women and minorities, who were having a difficult time
breaking into the system, but the basic economic model worked well: The
system of mass production generated high wages for the middle class, who
could use the wages to buy the products of the system.
That model no longer works, mainly because of technology. Technology
allows smaller production runs with the same economies of production scale.
New technologies allow companies to make more tailored products for par-
ticular end uses without sacrificing economies of scale. Computers and soft-
ware allow as few as ten of a product to be made at low cost. That means
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that anyone can enter anyone else’s business arena. Economies of scale
are no longer terribly important. Perhaps they matter to Wal-Mart when
it negotiates with suppliers, but economies of scale in terms of production
are not what they used to be.
In every industry there are not three, four, or five major players; no one
talks about oligopolies any more, clusters of a handful of major players
that coordinated production and output. They could do this because
nobody else could afford to enter their industry because of the barriers
posed by economies of scale. But now there is so much and such intense
competition that no industry is limited to a few competitors; every indus-
try has 10, 15, 20 global competitors. The traditional entry barriers have
dropped. The new barriers are in the form of innovation.
The way for a new competitor to get in is to be faster, cheaper, better,
more innovative. Through a website, the entire world can discover a new
invention within a month or two. In this new economy, investors, consum-
ers, and buyers now have all sorts of ways of discovering new products
from emerging companies. These companies, by the way, cannot rely on a
pyramid-shaped organizational structure, because it takes too much time
for ideas or information to get from the bottom to the top and then back
down again.
New economy organizations are highly flexible and adaptable, and
necessarily flatter in hierarchy. Innovators are to be found at all levels —
problem solvers, problem identifiers. These are not necessarily software
firms, or the likes of Yahoo or Google; these characteristics extend to all
parts of the economy, including education.
Technology has shifted the barriers to entry from high-volume to high-
value, from economies of scale to innovation. In the old economy, the
people at the top of the organization needed a college education because
they made strategic decisions. Most of the people in the middle — the
implementers — could have used a college degree, but it was not always
necessary. The blue-collar workers at the bottom did the same tasks
repetitively and did not need much in the way of education. They needed
to be compliant and reliable because they would be doing the same things
for forty years. At the end of their work life, they could look forward to
retirement and Social Security.
In the economy that we now find ourselves, blue-collar workers are
being replaced by people all over the world who are willing and eager to
work for a fraction of their wages or by technology. These people, who
used to be paid pretty well and were protected by unions are now in the
local service economy. That is where all the “routine” workers have
ended up: retail, restaurant, hotel, hospital, surface transportation, build-
ing and construction, child care, elder care. They do not compete with
people from elsewhere in the world because they perform a localized
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function. Nor are they competing with technology because the essence of
what they do is to provide personal services locally. The problem is that
these jobs do not pay nearly as well as the old economy’s middle-class
jobs.
In a system that depends on innovation, unlike the mass production
system, fewer than 8 percent of workers are in unions. The people who
are in the innovation sector have college and graduate degrees; they are
not paid to take orders, they identify and solve problems, recognize pat-
terns, perform experiments, think critically, and collaborate. Their educa-
tion is very different from that of the old economy.
It is quite understandable why incomes and wages are diverging as fast
as they are in the United States and in almost every so-called advanced
industrial society. Incomes, wages, and wealth diverge because there is a
greater demand for innovators, who are the key to competitive advantage,
and less demand for people who perform routine tasks. As more people
enter the local service economy, the competition heats up. It is true that
immigrants entering the workforce exert downward pressure, but the
members of the local service economy were not doing well to begin with.
Even without an influx of new immigrants, their wages would be de-
pressed because so many people, most without college degrees, are in the
labor pool.
A fifth of the American population is able to function in the new
economy, and a tenth can do it well. For these happy few, wages and
benefits keep on going up. Globalization and technical change work to
their benefit. Globalization means a larger market for their innovations;
technology means that their ideas have greater leverage and currency.
Sitting at a computer, with a single click you can send your ideas any-
where around the world. This is a world of symbols and analysis, innova-
tion, creativity, a world of constant and continuous change in response to
developing markets. But globalization and technology work against people
in the world of routine work. Hence the increasing gap in wealth, income,
and even opportunities.
Other things come into play; it is not all about globalization and tech-
nology. There are more concentrations of poverty than ever in the United
States. It is hard for people in geographic concentrations of poverty to be
exposed to models of adults who have been able to lift themselves up and
out. In addition to the absence of successful role models, the schools in
these areas are hamstrung by low and fragile tax bases. These schools
cannot provide nearly the quality of education that is to be found in the
more elite suburbs and private schools whose graduates go to good col-
leges and universities. The children of the service economy workers are
not going to college, or if they are, they have a hard time financing their
education.
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Demographics
The third vector is demographics. Demographics has a certain predictabil-
ity. Immigration may be a wild card, but we can predict the impact of the
baby boom generation. We know that 76 percent of the people born be-
tween 1946 and 1964 will reach retirement age within seven years, at which
point they will face a huge problem because they have not saved enough.
Baby boomers assumed that the trajectory of their earnings would follow
that of their parents; in fact, the trajectory of the boomers’ income has been
flat, and median wages adjusted for inflation are going down. People in
their fifties are beginning to realize that their retirement will not allow them
to lead the kinds of lives they expected. There are strains on personal
finances and concerns about the future of social security.
As a former trustee of the Social Security Trust Fund, I was privy to
conversations about social security. The news is not bad. The social security
actuaries have been using conservative estimates of economic growth, and
the predictions of the time when the fund will run out of money are based on
the assumptions that the United States economy will grow by 2.3 percent a
year over the next seventy-five years. But historically, since the Civil War,
the average yearly growth has been 3 percent. Even if we assume 2.8
percent, the so-called crisis in social security disappears. This is not to say
that we should not be worried about the future of government retirement
programs such as Medicare, which will be unaffordable, but assumptions
about the actual rate of growth of our economy offer some relief.
Some of that growth has to do with technological change, but also popu-
lation growth through immigration, Currently 12 percent of the population
was not born in the United States, a relatively high figure. Like the 1880s
and 1890s, when the percentage of immigrants was at its peak, many of the
current newcomers do not have much education. That adds a burden to our
systems of education and social services, but at the same time, the people
who get here are among the most ambitious in our country. You cannot
teach ambition, one of the critical ingredients of success in America as
determined by upward mobility. There is every reason to believe that the
people who are coming here will, like previous waves of immigrants, add
much more to society in a few years. And we need them.
Underlying all these trends — globalization, technological change, demo-
graphics — is education, not just primary and secondary education, but also
early childhood education. We need to rethink the way we characterize
educational development, starting with zero to five. Every dollar spent on
children before the age of five will reap huge returns on investment. Every
child today needs some education beyond K through 12; it may not neces-
sarily be a college degree, but some training in an area of expertise, technol-
ogy, or industry that can be the base for continuous learning.
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Most of us are smart enough to know that everything we learn today
may be obsolete in three to five years. What we need to teach is not a body
of knowledge that students will retain forever, but effective ways of think-
ing. We need to give them the tools and ways of understanding that will
help them continue to learn. The kind of testing that goes on nowadays in
many of our schools mainly teaches students how to take multiple-choice
tests. Life is not about taking multiple-choice tests, it is about learning to
think.
Exams are not bad; they help to benchmark, ensure that students are
learning what they should, and keep people accountable, but we have gone
overboard. We need to teach people about problem identification, problem
solving, experimentation, the ways that people learn to be innovative and
creative. When I visit schools today, I find that not much has changed from
my educational experience. That is nostalgically satisfying, but frightening
when I think about the future of our economy and what is happening in the
world today. So many terminally bored children are marking time in class-
rooms. Outside of the classroom, those same children show creativity and
imagination; some of the games that they play are so complicated that it is
obvious that these children are capable of much more. They could be creat-
ing, if not leading the world of the future, but what is being done to them in
their classrooms is shameful.
When he was sixteen, one of my sons came to me and said he was leaving
school. He had talked to his teachers, and they agreed with him. His grades
were excellent, but he felt that he was not getting anything out of his
classes. He assured me that he was not acting out; he wanted to pursue his
creative passions, whether as an actor or director, or through the medium of
the Internet. He hoped to learn in more formal settings in the future, but at
that time, he was anxious to do something. He already had a job, an apart-
ment, and sufficient finances to live independently. My wife and I had long
discussions about this, and despite my finest reasoning about the importance
of graduating high school and getting a college degree, he was bent on
cultivating his creativity. Five years later, at the age of twenty-one, he has
maintained that earlier passion, and by any internal or external benchmarks
of success, he has been successful. He earned a GED along the way, and
takes courses when he can, and even teaches. He is more involved with
education, innovation, and creativity than I at his age.
The point is that there are many different ways of learning; Howard
Gardner told us that years ago when he wrote about multiple intelligences.
Unfortunately, while the economy has been transformed, our educational
institutions have remained unchanged. K through 12 and higher education
are still designed for the old high-volume, standardized, stable mass produc-
tion system: a top-down, regimented system where everyone does the same
thing, learns a uniform curriculum, graduates at the same age after going
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through the same sequences, as in an assembly line. If we took seriously the
implications of a world of continuous change, innovation, and creativity,
our educational system would look very different. Even at the university
level, things have not changed much since my undergraduate years; instead,
departments have become silos, with little interaction between departments.
What is needed is a much more open and varied system featuring more
choices and more opportunities at various times and places.
The new economy offers more paths of innovation and creativity than
ever, more opportunities to succeed for those who have passion and creativ-
ity. Education can bring this out in students, but only if it is geared toward
understanding their passion and needs over a lifetime. All of us will be
involved in the business of lifelong education because globalization, innova-
tion, and demographics require it. Learning does not and cannot end at the
age of twenty-two, thirty-eight, forty-five, sixty, or eighty.
The joy, passion, and importance of learning will spread throughout our
lifetime, and not only in this country, but all over the world. As educators,
those of you in continuing education need to be evangelists to make sure
that others understand these dynamics. We need to create opportunities for
all our children, all of our people. Many Americans are sinking, the gap is
growing; it is not healthy for our society. It is a waste, especially since the
number of good jobs is unlimited. There is no limit to the ingenuity of the
human mind or to the needs of human beings, and when ingenuity and needs
are combined, the opportunities for success are immense. But it all begins
and ends with the right kind of learning.
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